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The extended mind view and the embodied-grounded view of cognition and language
are typically considered as rather independent perspectives. In this paper we propose a
possible integration of the two views and support it proposing the idea of “Words As social
Tools” (WAT). In this respect, we will propose that words, also due to their social and
public character, can be conceived as quasi-external devices that extend our cognition.
Moreover, words function like tools in that they enlarge the bodily space of action thus
modifying our sense of body. To support our proposal, we review the relevant literature
on tool-use and on words as tools and report recent evidence indicating that word use
leads to an extension of space close to the body. In addition, we outline a model of the
neural processes that may underpin bodily space extension via word use and may reﬂect
possible effects on cognition of the use of words as external means.We also discuss how
reconciling the two perspectives can help to overcome the limitations they encounter if
considered independently.
Keywords: embodied cognition, extended cognition, tool-use, words as tools, language comprehension, social
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INTRODUCTION
The embodied-grounded (EG) view and the extended mind (EM)
view of cognition and language are typically considered as rather
independent perspectives. Aim of this paper is to show how the
two views can be integrated considering the case of words in their
relationship with the bodily space. Speciﬁcally, we will propose
that words are a very peculiar kind of tool.
According to embodied views of cognition, cognitive processes
are constrained by our body, that is, human-like cognition can-
not occur independently of a human-like body. In the embodied
view, cognition is not for knowing; rather,“cognition is for action”
(Wilson, 2002). Proponents of grounded views make a similar
argument but posit that the involvement of the body is not exhaus-
tive of cognition, which is grounded in many ways (Barsalou,
2008). In fact, while initially the label “embodied” was used in
a more comprehensive way, in the recent literature a slight distinc-
tion between embodied and grounded approaches, and between
the terms “embodied” and “grounded,” is emerging (see Pezzulo
et al., 2011; Fischer, 2012; Myachykov et al., in press). According
to this view cognition can be grounded in multiple ways. These
include not only bodily states, but also situations, actions, etc.
(Barsalou, 2008; Pezzulo et al., 2011). In the following, we will use
the term embodied and grounded cognition (EG) to refer to both
approaches, since the distinction is not relevant for the proposal
we will advance.
When it comes to language processing, EG views argue that lan-
guage is grounded in perception and action systems (for reviews:
Willems and Hagoort, 2007; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Gallese,
2008; Toni et al., 2008; Jirak et al., 2010; Borghi and Pecher, 2011,
2012; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012). Comprehending language
would imply activating a simulation, consisting in a re-enactment
of the previous interaction with objects, situations, etc., to which
linguistic expressions refer.
In the last years another perspective on cognition, the EM
view, is gaining credit, in particular in philosophy. The under-
lying idea, initially promoted by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is
that the human mind is not wholly in our head/brain, but it
is rather distributed in our brain, body, and external devices.
These external devices (e.g., computers) have the power to
complement and augment our internal cognitive processes (see
Wilson, 2010).
In this paper, we will ﬁrst discuss some general limitations
of EG and EM views, then address some more speciﬁc limits of
these views in understanding the role of language. We will then
suggest that words can be understood as social tools, and explain
why, in our opinion, this approach helps to reconcile EG and
EM views of cognition and to overcome their limitations. Finally,
we will discuss experimental evidence to support the Words as
social Tools (WAT) proposal and we will outline a computational
model to specify the neural mechanisms that might underlie the
aforementioned processes.
EMBODIED-GROUNDED AND EXTENDED VIEWS
Even though we favor an EG approach to cognition, we hold that
EG theories have some problems (for critiques to aspects of the
embodied approach, see Borghi and Cimatti, 2009, 2010; Chat-
terjee, 2010; van Elk et al., 2010; Wilson and Golonka, 2013). We
will consider ﬁrst some problems characterizing the EG approach
in general, and then we will focus on the limitations of the EG
approach to language, in particular to language comprehension.
We will focus on content issues and not on methodological prob-
lems, as for example the problem of the lack of precise and
unidirectional predictions, which in our opinion can be solved
with a more extensive use of computational models (see for dis-
cussions on this problem Borghi et al., 2010; Chersi et al., 2010;
Willems and Franken, 2012). Notice that our critiques might not
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necessarily concern all versions of EG views, which are sometimes
rather different (see Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009, for an
analysis of this). One major problem of EG views is the high risk
of adopting the view that Clark (2008) has called “brainbound.”
In this view, human cognition directly depends on neural activ-
ity, with the mind being modeled as inner and neurally realized.
This position does not accept the idea that cognition might be
distributed and extended beyond bodily borders. The brainbound
view is not convincing for a simple reason, as explained by Noe
(2009): “the subject of experience is not a bit of your body. You are
not your brain. The brain, rather, is part of what you are” (pp. 7).
In our opinion many versions of the EG view are too brainbound:
they emphasize too much the role of the brain with respect to the
body. This might seem paradoxical for an embodied approach:
obviously no embodied view does fully neglect the importance of
the body, butmanyEGapproaches ascribe a too relevant role to the
brain compared to the whole body, at the same time neglecting the
possible role of body extensions. Similar critiques are expressed by
Wilson and Golonka (2013) who claim: “The major problem with
this research is that it again assumes all the hard work is done in
the head, with perception and action merely tweaking the result.”
(Wilson and Golonka, 2013, p. 11). van Elk et al. (2010) further
deepen this point, arguing that in cognitive neuroscience embod-
ied approaches are still cognitivist. We report their own words:
“In cognitive neuroscience the notion that concepts are embodied
primarily means that there is a correspondence between the brain
activations associatedwith processing the referent of a concept and
the processing of the concept itself. For instance, seeing a car and
thinking or reading about a car involves the activation in compa-
rable visual areas. Thus, the dispute between modal and amodal
theories of language comprehension is basically a discussion about
the representational vehicle of concepts (i.e., whether the repre-
sentational vehicle of concepts is shared with neural resources
used for perception and action). Both modal and amodal theories
of language thus share a cognitivist notion of cognition in terms
of discrete internal representations of the world” (van Elk et al.,
2010, p. 3).
The second problem with many EG theories is that they do
not sufﬁciently consider and emphasize the fact that the sense of
body might be plastically rearranged. Body boundaries are treated
as rather static while some studies have revealed that they are
ﬂexible and can be modiﬁed, for example through the use of tools,
changing with our sense of body (see for example the special issue
on the sense of body by Tessari et al., 2010). We will further address
this problem in the rest of the paper.
When they deal with language, one major limit of EG views
is that language is mainly conceived in its referential aspects. This
wayof conceiving language relies on the classical notion that know-
ing themeaning of aword is knowingwhat it refers to. Accordingly,
the meaning of a word like“hammer”consists in the re-enactment
of past multimodal experiences with the word referent, i.e. ham-
mers. For example, according to the indexical theory (Glenberg
and Robertson, 2000) words would index their referents in the
world, which would be represented in terms of perceptual symbols
(Barsalou, 1999). This referential view of language has a number
of merits. First, it provided the instruments to contrast the propo-
sitional view, which was dominant in psychology and cognitive
sciences (see Lakoff, 2012, for a description of the times before
the idea of embodied cognition). In this view concepts and word
meanings were seen as the product of a transduction process from
sensorimotor to abstract knowledge. Knowledge would be rep-
resented in terms of amodal symbols only arbitrarily related to
their referents, organized through syntactic combinatorial rules
(e.g., Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984). More recent non-embodied
views posit that word meaning is a consequence of the statisti-
cal distribution of words in language (for an inﬂuential version,
see Landauer and Dumais, 1997). However, today the necessity to
contrast the statistical and the embodied view is not so critical,
and conciliatory approaches have been proposed (see for example
Andrews et al., in press).
Second, the inﬂuential research program based on these
premises has inspired many studies, which have led to important
and sophisticated experimental results (for reviews see Barsalou,
2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Toni et al., 2008;
Jirak et al., 2010; Borghi and Pecher, 2011, 2012). However, an
embodied referential view is probably not sufﬁcient to provide a
thorough account of word meaning.
While in psychology and cognitive science the propositional
view has dominated for a long time and the referential view was
introduced by EG theorists as an alternative to it, in philosophy
the referential view of language has been widely criticized since
at least the seminal work of Wittgenstein (1953; see Noe, 2009
for a contemporary statement): the most widespread view in phi-
losophy holds that, for example, we can speak about fawns even
if we have never seen them since we can rely on the expertise of
our community. Words are compositional and we can access the
meaning of words of which we do not know or cannot see the ref-
erent thanks to the expertise of other members of our community.
As Noe (2009) nicely argues, “meaning depends on the practice”
(p. 90), and being able to use words corresponds to knowing what
they mean.
Curiously, while philosophical examinations have gravitated
toward treating the practical nature of meaning, the referential
view is still the predominant one in EG cognition theories. This
has probably been due to the desire, on the part of EG propo-
nents, to contrast the traditional propositional view, according
to which words are arbitrarily linked to their referents. EG pro-
ponents have assumed that it was necessary to demonstrate that
words are grounded, as their referents activate perception and
motor systems.
Beyond the limit of the focus on referentiality, in our view the
EG view of language has two further limitations given that it has
neglected two other important aspects of words. The ﬁrst concerns
the social and public nature of words, the second the fact that
words can be instruments for action. Words are social and public
because, since they are a heritage of our speakers’ community,
to be effective they require someone else’s presence, implicit or
not. Indeed, speaking implies performing complementary actions
in coordination with someone else (Clark, 1996). Words can be
instruments for action since their use allows humans to modify
the current state of the world, as it happens during tool-use. This
point will be further developed in the course of the paper.
If EG approaches often tacitly assume a brainbound view of
cognition, the most vigorous attack to this view derives from the
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idea that cognition is not limited to the boundaries of body/skull
but is extended. In other words, “minds like ours emerge from this
colorful ﬂux as surprisingly seamless wholes: adaptively potent
mashups extruded from a dizzying motley of heterogeneous ele-
ments and processes” (Clark, 2008, p. 219). According to the EM
view, tools complement our mental abilities: for example, a diary
complements our memory. As a consequence of this relationship
between brain-body system and external tools, our mind would
be distributed (Hutchins, 1995) across a variety of bodily parts
and non-bodily devices (Clark, 2003; Thompson and Stapleton,
2009). One potential limitation of EM views, and possibly one of
the reasonswhy they have encountered resistance, is their appeal to
functionalism (Kiverstein and Clark, 2009) which might conﬂict
with the assumptions of an embodied view of cognition (but see
Clark, 2008, for a different position, which does not put the two
approaches in contrast).
The EM approach holds a peculiar view of the relation between
words and cognition. Words themselves are considered as external
devices and as cognitive tools capable of augmenting our com-
putational abilities (Clark, 1998). This view (e.g., Clark, 1998)
has its roots in the seminal work of Vygotsky (1962) who under-
lined the role played by inner language and its scaffolding function
supporting actions. However, in our opinion, one of the most
interesting aspects of Vygotsky’s notion of inner language is that
it involves the internalization of a phenomenon which is ini-
tially (and inherently) social and public and which augments our
computational abilities. Such a social and public component is,
however, underappreciated in the EM approach, which instead
underlines the importance of language for developing thought
and computational abilities.
Here we propose that EG and EM views can, and should, be
integrated. Such integration will overcome their respective limi-
tations when dealing with language: the limited focus of the EG
view on the referential aspect of words and the neglect of the social
dimension of words in the EM view.
THE INCORPORATION OF PHYSICAL TOOLS
Even if it does not pertain to language, one line of research that
may suggest how EG and EM views can be reconciled comes from
recent work on the recoding of bodily space after tool-use. Below
we will brieﬂy review the behavioral, neural and computational
literature on this topic and will then try to highlight why it is
relevant for us.
Since Iriki’s seminal work with monkeys (e.g., Iriki et al., 1996),
neuroscientiﬁc studies with humans have revealed that active tool-
use can change the representation of space, in particular inducing
an extension of the near space (Berlucchi and Aglioti, 1997; Berti
and Frassinetti, 2000; Maravita and Iriki, 2004; Farnè et al., 2005;
Osiurak et al., 2012).
The neural mechanisms underlying the extension of body rep-
resentation caused by the use of a tool have not yet been identiﬁed
(Magosso et al., 2010; Stout andChaminade,2012). Recently, some
attempts mainly using computational modeling approaches have
been proposed with the aim of identifying such mechanisms. Each
proposed model sheds light on some important aspect underlying
the phenomena. Ursino et al. (2007) and Magosso et al. (2010),
for example, point out the involvement of visual-tactile cortical
regions serving the representation of action affordances and action
outcomes (including the parietal cortex, PC, and the pre-motor
cortex, PMC) and Hebbian associative mechanisms to shape the
body representation after using a tool. In particular, Ursino et al.
(2007) claim that the enlargement of the peripersonal space after
tool-use depends on an expansion of the visual receptive ﬁeld of
parietal bimodal neurons due to a strengthening of visual synapses
through Hebbian mechanisms. In the same line the model pro-
posed by Magosso et al. (2010) shows how different tool-use tasks
lead to different re-sizing effects of the peri-hand space. Themodel
also predicts that, after tool-use, a far visual stimulus acts as a near
one, independently of whether the tool is present or absent in the
subject’s hand. The authors validate this prediction by an in-vivo
experiment. Other models focus on the role of sub-cortical areas
(such as the cerebellum, see Arbib et al., 2009, and Imamizu and
Kawato, 2012) in learning and storing internal models of body
and environment after the use of a tool. Other ones suggest that
memory processes are responsible for the dynamical aspects of
tool-use during tool-body assimilation (Nabeshima et al., 2007;
Nishide et al., 2009).
An open issue in the literature on bodily extension concerns
whether the characteristic recoding of spatial perception also
determines a change the body schema. We will brieﬂy focus
on this discussion since it is important for our view of lan-
guage. One interesting distinction is between bodily extension
determined by successful tool-use and incorporation following
successful prosthesis-use. According to De Preester and Tsakiris
(2009), tool-use does not determine changes in the sense of body-
ownership, but only inmotor andperceptual capacities (Botvinick,
2004). A crucial difference is the experience of completion: a non-
corporeal object can be incorporated if it replaces something that
originally was present, and now is missing. If the object cannot be
assimilated to the pre-existing body-model (Tsakiris, 2010), true
incorporation cannot occur. Beyond incorporation and use, there
might be different degrees of relationship between ourselves and
the objects. Some objects are perceived as external, while other
objects provoke effects in our own sense of body. However, even
objects perceived as completely external evoke motor responses
(affordances), if they are close enough toourownbody (Costantini
et al., 2011b; Ambrosini et al., 2012; for a comprehensive review on
affordances see Thill et al., 2013).
The same distinction between incorporation and use can also
be applied to language. The question we will address in the fol-
lowing pages was initially proposed by Clark (2008, p. 39) in the
following formulation: “Could anything like this notion of incor-
poration (rather than mere use). . . get a grip in the more ethereal
domain of mind and cognition?”We will show how the notion of
incorporation can be applied to the“ethereal”domain of language.
Here words, and in particular their public and social dimensions,
come into play.
WORDS AS SOCIAL TOOLS: THE CASE OF SPACE
The idea that words can be conceived as tools is not completely
new. Beyond Wittgenstein (1953), it has been proposed by a num-
ber of authors (Clark, 1998; Borghi and Cimatti, 2009, 2010,
2012; Mirolli and Parisi, 2009, 2011; Tylèn et al., 2010). However,
different aspects of this idea have been stressed.
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InPhilosophical Researches,Wittgenstein (1953) highlighted the
fact that words can have different and multiple functions, as tools
in a toolbox. Clark (1998) spoke of the “magic” of words: words
are external artefacts endowed with the power to augment and
complement our computational abilities. According to him, while
emphasis has been put on the communicative aspects of language,
its computational role has been neglected, with the possible excep-
tion of Vygotsky who has underlined the role played by inner
language and scaffolding to direct our actions.
The view we will present is slightly different. We agree that
the computational role of inner language, intended as a guide for
action, has not been considered enough. However, we intend to
stress the role of other aspects of words that, despite the novel burst
of interest for social neuroscience, have been neglected: the social
and public role words possess. In order to be effective, words do
not only need to refer correctly to objects or situations in theworld.
Language is also a powerful instrument for joint action. Words are
tools, as they allow for the mental manipulation of information
(Malt and Wolff, 2010). This in an individual and private use, as
some authors have underlined. However, words have a peculiarity:
to manipulate inner information we take advantage of a device
that is social and public in its nature. For this reason we claim
that words are “social tools.” Speciﬁcally, in this paper we will
consider a special case of similarity between words as social tools
and physical tools, concerning the relationship between space and
body.
Words and physical tools share an important feature: both can
be used to accomplish goals via external means, respectively, other
people and objects, resulting in a change of the current state of
the world (Glenberg and Gallese, 2012) and in an extension of
our capabilities. Consider the case of words as tools that can be
used to reach for something. We can reach objects with a physical
tool (e.g., a rake), but also by asking somebody to bring them to
us. Thus, in certain contexts the same goal can be reached either
through tools, or through words. In some cases, words are even
more powerful than tools. For example, they might allow us to
reach very distant objects.
However, words work as tools only under the condition that
other people collaborate. Even if our proposal is in debt with
the pragmatics literature (e.g., Levinson, 1983) and with Austin
(1962)’s idea that we do things with words, here we intend to
make a distinction between advancing a request for an object and
performing an action with a tool. These two activities share many
similarities, but are also clearly different. An action with an instru-
ment can be planned but fail, for example due to problems of the
instrument, etc. Similarly, a request can be disattended, either
because of problems in its formulation, or due to disruptions in
communication, or scarce compliance on the side of the addressee.
But people can decide to use tools to reach a goal on their own,
without the presence of other individuals. This is not possible with
words. The referent of a word can be found, but if other individ-
uals do not provide a support, i.e., if the social dimension implied
in word use is absent, the request will not succeed. Thus words
are a peculiar kind of instrument: they work effectively only if
other people are available and respond positively to our implicit
or explicit request.What counts is the dynamic interaction they are
able to promote (see Cooke et al., 2013, on team cognition). When
performing activities which require coordination, such as lifting
very heavy objects, we need to possess the sophisticated ability to
understand others’ action plans, others’ willingness to collaborate,
etc. (Marsh et al., 2009). Similarly, this ability should be present
during language use as well, otherwise words, even if referentially
correct, are not effective. In this respect, words constitute a bridge
between ourselves, the environment and the others.
Here we propose that words and tools share a further similar-
ity: we consider the possibility that when we use words to reach
for something, word use expands the near space, modifying the
representation of the relationship between our own body and the
objects in space, similarly towhat happens after tool use. The argu-
ment behind this hypothesis is the following: if words are similar
to tools, then their use should lead to an extension of the bodily
space, as it happens with real tools.
One could object that words and tools are substantially differ-
ent, since tools are physical things in the world that we use with
our bodies while words are not. We understand the objection, but
the perspective we endorse is radically different: according to WAT
(e.g., Borghi and Cimatti, 2009, 2012) not only tools but words
as well can be considered as physical things. They are expressed
through our bodies, be they spoken or written, and once pro-
nounced or written they have a material and public existence,
similarly to tools (Wittgenstein, 1953; Clark, 1998).
Now consider the relationship betweenwords and body accord-
ing to EG theories and the relationship between words and mind
according to theEMview. EG theorists demonstrated that compre-
hending words activates the motor system. EM theorists propose
that, as tools extend our body schema, “language extends our
capacities for thought and therefore can be treated as extending
our mind schema” (Noe, 2009). In fact, it has been shown that
language modiﬁes cognition, for example inﬂuencing perception
and categorization (Wolff and Malt, 2010), in a ﬂexible manner
(Lupyan, 2012). But so far nobody has shown that word use might
recode our bodily space with respect to objects, as it happens for
physical tools. Notice that the parallel between words and tools is
not only abstract and metaphorical; in contrast, we formulate the
precise prediction, to be tested experimentally, that both words
and physical tools have a speciﬁc effect on cognition, i.e., that their
use determines an expansion of the bodily space representations.
Demonstrating this would imply to apply the notion of incorpo-
ration to the “ethereal” domain of language. At the same time, it
could help reconcile the EG and the EM view.
WORDS AS SOCIAL TOOLS AND SPACE: EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE AND A MODEL
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Recent experimental evidence supports the idea that words can be
considered as tools that extend the bodily space.
Scorolli et al. (2011; submitted) and Scorolli and Borghi (2012)
demonstrated with a kinematics study that word use modiﬁes spa-
tial perception. Participants, children and adults, observed objects
located in the peripersonal, extrapersonal or far and “border”
space. For operational reasonswe deﬁned“peripersonal,”or“near,”
as the space reachable extending the arm (but see the discussion
on the problems of this deﬁnition due to the plasticity of the
near space made by Longo and Lourenco, 2006; Lourenco and
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Longo, 2009), “extrapersonal,” or “far,” as the non-reachable space,
and “border” as the space reachable extending the arm and the
back. Before and after training, subjects were asked to produce
explicit verbal estimations on objects’ distances, or to throw a
toy-car toward objects’ locations. During the training phase par-
ticipants had to reach and grasp the“right”object and to put it in a
box provided by different shaped holes. If the right object was too
far, they could use a tool (a rake), press a button or use a linguistic
label, pronouncing the object noun; all instruments were effec-
tive in reaching the goal. We introduced the button since we were
interested in comparing the rake and the button, i.e., two instru-
ments that, differently from words, do not imply a social context
to be used. While participants hold the rake in their hands, the
button has an arbitrary relation to the object, similarly to a word:
once pressed, the object appears. In the last years, few studies have
shown that even arbitrary relationships with a target can mod-
ify the perception of peripersonal space. Davoli et al. (2012) have
shown that remote interactions with a target, for example illumi-
nating the target object with a laser pointer, caused an extension
of the perceived space. In the same vein, Bassolino et al. (2010)
demonstrated that frequent use of a computer mouse determined
a spatial extension. The difference between a button, i.e., a device
that is arbitrary linked to the object to be reached, and a word is
that the last one implies a social dimension.
The results of the study revealed that after training, even if the
verbal estimations changed slightly, the car was thrown signiﬁ-
cantly closer than before the training. This indicated an extension
of the reachable space, not modulated by the instrument kind.
As other studies on extended body, this work suggests that the
distinction between near and far space is plastic and ﬂexible. How-
ever, here the extension was brought about not only by physical
tools but by immaterial ones as well, i.e. by words. The social
dimension implicit in words made this possible: pronouncing an
object name implies evoking somebody else performing a comple-
mentary action, helping us reach a distant object. Thus words, like
tools, helpus act in theworld and inﬂuenceourwayof representing
bodily space with respect to objects (Gianelli et al., 2013). How-
ever, with words, our operational space becomes larger because of
the presence of others. Even if we propose that the social dimen-
sion is intrinsic in word use per se, we predict that the results
will be stronger, i.e. the spatial extension with words will be more
marked, in presence of another person. In particular, this exten-
sion should be particularly marked if the other person is close to
the object, is looking directly at the participant and demonstrates
through gestures and posture to be open to the interaction (see
Innocenti et al., 2012; Scorolli et al., 2012). We predict, instead,
that if the other person is not close to the object, and the body
posture and the facial expression of the other are not expressing
compliance, the effects of words will be reduced, given that the
request is less likely to be attended. In sum, Scorolli et al. (2011;
submitted) have shown that words alone are effective in modifying
the bodily space. However, we predict that their effect will be more
marked in a context in which the social dimension is emphasized,
thanks to the real presence of another person.
These results are complementary with those obtained by
Costantini et al. (2011b). Previous evidence demonstrated that
objects afford actions only when presented in the peripersonal
space e.g., Costantini et al. (2011a). The novelty of the study by
Costantini et al. (2011b) consisted in showing that when the object
was outside subject’s reaching space but within an avatar’s reach-
ing space, it evoked affordances as well. According to the authors,
this indicates that an interpersonal body representation is formed
in which one’s own arm reaching space is mapped with that of
others’. Notice that an avatar might evoke the presence of another
person, but the effects it produces might not be as strong as those
elicited by the presence of a real other.
However, these ﬁndings together with those by Scorolli et al.
(2011; submitted) and Scorolli and Borghi (2012), in which words
refer only implicitly to the presence of another person, suggest that
the subject’s representation of reaching space is actually extended.
Importantly, in the study by Scorolli et al. (2011; submitted) the
other person plays a complementary role as he/she is implicitly
evoked to perform an action one cannot perform alone (Newman-
Norlund et al., 2007).
In sum: it has been suggested that active tool-use determines
a progressive incorporation of the tool within the body schema
(Iriki et al., 1996; Povinelli et al., 2010). The analogous extension
of the operational space found after the rake, the button and the
word use suggests that the reaching space extension is not due to
the possibility of the tool to be integrated into the body schema,
but to the goal-directed character of the action (Hommel et al.,
2001; Massen and Prinz, 2009). However, some issues remain
open.
The studies discussed so far indicate that words, similarly to
real tools, determine a plastic modiﬁcation of the reaching space,
even if they cannot be integrated into the body schema as tools
do. However, the evidence we reported concerns concrete words,
and speciﬁcally words with speciﬁc referents endowed with a pre-
cise spatial location. One could ask whether the claim that words
are tools can be generalized, i.e., whether other kinds of words
can determine variations in the bodily space. Even if we are not
aware of any evidence, we can speculate that even words like “the”
or like “freedom,” which do not have a speciﬁc concrete counter-
part, can expand our near space (for work on mapping between
demonstratives such as “this” and “that” and near and far space,
see Coventry et al., 2008, 2012; Bonﬁglioli et al., 2009). As we say
something to somebody else through words we somehow create
a novel, shared space. This should happen with each word, as
each word is pronounced to be heard by somebody else. However,
while we reported evidence showing that concrete words expand
the peripersonal space, the possibility that this is true for other
kinds of words is currently a speculation, and further research is
needed in order to demonstrate it.
A further question one could raise is the following: do intransi-
tive gestures as well induce an extension of the near space, similarly
to tools? Indeed, for communicative gestures to succeed, we need
that others are available and ready to collaborate, as it happenswith
words. Compared to gestures, however, words have a number of
advantages: (a) they are typically more speciﬁc than gestures (e.g.,
I can point to an object I would like to receive, but the context
might not help you to identify the precise object: this potential
problem can be easily solved using the appropriate word); (b) they
are arbitrarily related to their referents, and this allows more free-
dom of action; (c) also thanks to b, they are less tightly anchored
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to a speciﬁc context and situation. Normally gestures coexist with
words, even if they can have a separate meaning (McNeill, 2000;
Kendon, 2004). Furthermore, it has been shown that gestures
do not develop imitating others, but emerge in an autonomous
way and are integrated in speech, probably because they facilitate
thinking (Bates, 1976; Capirci et al., 1996; Iverson and Goldin-
Meadow, 1998). On this basis we can advance the prediction that
combinations of gestures and words would increase the effect with
respect to words alone. As to the sign language, where gestures
directly substitute words, we predict a similar effect as the one
obtained with words. But consider the case in which gestures
are not coupled with words but used as substitutes for them. In
this case our predictions are not so straightforward, and further
research is needed to investigate this important issue (for relevant
work, see De Stefani et al., under review).
TOWARD A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF WORDS AS SOCIAL TOOLS
Although the models reviewed in the Section “The incorporation
of physical tools”give important insights on the brain mechanisms
underlying the adaptation of body representation after using a
tool, they do not deal with the question of the possible neu-
ral mechanisms underlying the processes of words as tools. To
address this problem, it is crucial to consider three key aspects
not yet considered by previous models: (a) the brain has a hierar-
chically (soft)modular organization (Meunier et al., 2010; Houk,
2011; b) such organization pivots on anticipatory/goal-based rep-
resentations of actions at multiple levels (Hamilton and Grafton,
2008; c) words are grounded on the same (or contiguous) neural
representations sub-serving action (for reviews, see Martin, 2007;
Jirak et al., 2010).
A bio-inspired neural architecture based on these points is
sketched in Figure 1. The overall model architecture is built on
the model of Caligiore et al. (2010), capturing important aspects
of hierarchical brain organization. Even if the model proposed
here is not computationally implemented, the discussion of its
design features allows us to unveil important aspects overlooked
by current models on tool-body assimilation. These aspects could
be important to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying the
notion of words as social tools.
Figure 1A represents the fact that the vision of an object in the
peripersonal space evokes several potential affordances (encoded
by the neurons of PC) and actions (encoded by the neurons
of PMC) selected based on BG and local competitions (Cisek,
2007). Importantly, some neurons of these areas represent affor-
dances and actions in terms of expected outcomes (Hamilton and
Grafton, 2008) or goals (“distal goals,”Umiltà et al., 2008), such as
“reaching the object,” rather than in terms of detailed movement
commands encoded in the motor cortex (MC). The pre-frontal
cortex (PFC), which encodes the agent’s ultimate goals based on
the internal and external context, exerts a top-down biasing effect
on the formation of proximal goals and on the selection of differ-
ent affordances and actions taking place in the PC and PMC and
ultimately leading to perform speciﬁc movements (MC).
The mechanisms of affordance and action selection based
on goals are crucial to explain the modulation of neural
representations when a tool is used to reach far objects. The key
idea is that the neurons of PC/PMC encoding affordances and
actions in terms of expected effects can allow the abstraction of the
speciﬁc aspects of actions pertaining to the use of the limb or the
tool. For example, Figure 1B shows that, when using a tool to
FIGURE 1 | A model of tool-body assimilation. In the model, the visual
cortex (VC) performs basic visual processing; the parietal cortex (PC) extracts
affordances based on body/world relations and encodes abstract action goals;
the pre-motor cortex (PMC) prepares actions based on more speciﬁc action
goals; the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) encodes the agent’s ultimate goals based
on context and internal homeostatic regulations, and on this basis contributes
to form action goals in the PMC and the PC; cortico-cerebellar (Cer) loops
simulate body-world, dynamics; cortico-basal ganglia (BG) loops underlie
action and affordance selection processes. (A–C) represent a possible
progression of development of representations from body actions, to
tool-mediated actions and words-as-tool actions, all relying on the same
macro brain areas and on partially overlapping local neural modules (cell
assemblies). Multiple PC-PMC arrows represent multiple affordance-action
options and the black arrow the most active within these.
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reach the object, PC neurons might encode the salient features of
both the target and the tool while PMC neurons might encode
the “reach the target” goal: as these representations have many fea-
tures in common (same object and context, similar effect, similar
attentional focus on the object, etc.) with those activated when
reaching without a tool, the neural populations encoding them
might strongly overlap and form Hebbian associations. These
might lead to change the representations related to space.
The effects of words as tool on space representation might be
due to thesemechanisms and to the fact thatwords are grounded in
the sameneural structures underlying perception and action (Cali-
giore et al., 2010). Figure 1C shows this with an example where the
object is in the extrapersonal space but another person is close to
it. In this case, the use of a phono-articulation of a word (e.g., the
name of the target directed at a caregiver in childhood) might pro-
duce the same outcome of a direct reach. This and the similarities
of context, intentions, target, or even (failed) reaching movement,
might cause an overlap and association between the space-related
representations active in the two conditions. The fact that heard
words may further compact sensorimotor representations (Mirolli
and Parisi, 2009) would strengthen this process. This might
warp all representations of space incorporating “reachability”
information and lead to effects such as those observed in our study.
Possible alternatives to our view could refer to the fact
that the neural basis for language comprehension and tool-use
might to some extent differ. As it is well known, the ventral
stream plays a major role for semantics and language process-
ing, whereas the dorsal stream is crucial for action preparation
and execution (e.g., Chao and Martin, 2000; Johnson-Frey et al.,
2005), processes very important for tool-use. There is also clear
evidence of dissociations between language and praxis in neu-
ropsychological patients (e.g., Buxbaum et al., 2001; Humphreys
and Forde, 2001).
We do not think that our proposal is really weakened by these
arguments, for at least two reasons. First, recent literature has
smoothened the distinction between ventral and dorsal streams
(see for example Goodale and Westwood, 2004). Some authors
have shown the many interactions between the two routes (Gallese
et al., 1999). Furthermore, a sub-distinction between a dorso-
dorsal and a dorso-ventral route has been proposed (e.g., Rizzolatti
and Matelli, 2003). Accordingly, words referring to action would
be processed in the dorso-ventral rather than in the ventral stream
(see proposals by Binkofski and Buxbaum, in press; Borghi and
Riggio, 2009; Marino et al., 2013).
More generally, our aim is to show that in some conditions
words can change some of our internal brain representations as is
done by tools (for an analysis of shared brain mechanisms between
complex tool-use and language, see Frey, 2008), but not that the
caused changes are identical in the two conditions.
At a more basic level, here we do not intend to argue that
language use equals tool-use in all respects. In line with theories
of reuse (e.g., Anderson, 2010) we think that language is grounded
in the sensorimotor system, but that, being at a higher abstraction
level,modiﬁcations and constraints are introduced (for developing
this argument, see Borghi, 2012). In synthesis, our aim is to show
that words are tools, but they are not only tools.
CONCLUSION
Words are ﬁrst encountered as objects. They are peculiar objects,
though, because they implicitly refer to a social and public dimen-
sion and because they are immaterial ones. Later they become
internalized (Vygotsky, 1962). The capability to use (inner) lan-
guage modiﬁes our internal processes; language is a powerful
means to reconﬁgure our mental abilities and capability of con-
trol. Therefore words help us in “self-engineering” ourselves, to
perform better in our ecological niche. But when we produce
them, words are also objects outside from us. Differently from
the physical tools that, when used, recode the spatial relationship
between our body and the world, words are part of the ethereal
world of cognition. Even if they are immaterial, we have sug-
gested that words are both extended and embodied. They are both
extended and embodied because their use determines a remap-
ping of the relationships between our body, the objects and the
space.
The evidence that EG theorists have collected shows that words
are embodied andgrounded inour sensorimotor system. However,
so far EG research has been exceedingly focused on words’ refer-
ents and on how their meaning is represented in the brain, while
neglecting what can be achieved through words. Seeing words
as tools that extend our near space allow us to overcome these
limitations.
At the same time, EM theorists have shown that words can be
used as tools that augment our computational potentialities, and
that meaning is not limited to what is represented in the brain.
However, the EM perspective has insufﬁciently explored the social
andpublic rolewords play. Aswehave shown, the remappingof the
bodily space we found with words is granted by the fact that words
imply the presence of others: somehow our own space becomes
larger as it incorporates the space of others. These implied others
complement our abilities, and we call them into play by means of
words.
In sum, we think that the idea that words work as social
tools that extend our near space can help combining two very
promising and sophisticated perspectives, the EG and the EM
views.
We agreewithClark (2008)when he invites us“to cease to unre-
ﬂectively privilege the inner, the biological, the neural.”(p. 218).
Accepting this invitation does not imply avoiding to ascribe value
to the inner, the biological, the neural. In contrast, it permits the
combination of an EG and an extended perspective on cognition
in which the mind emerges “at the productive interface of brain,
body, and social andmaterial world.”Treatingwords as social tools
highlights exactly this.
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